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Twenty years after the fall of the iron curtain—which for decades had separated East 
from West—most countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now members of the 
European Union; some have even adopted the euro. Nonetheless, these countries have 
also remained exceptionally vulnerable to upset, including those that originate beyond 
their immediate sphere of influence as revealed by the global financial crisis. This paper 
explains this with the governance of finance, i.e., the allocation of de jure and de facto 
responsibilities for financial systems, which deprives host countries of capital flows of 
critical policy tools. 
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1 Introduction 
A functioning market-based economy depends on a well-working financial system—
i.e., on organizations that intermediate between savings and investments and allocate 
resources, as well as on institutional arrangements that mitigate the risk of collapse 
associated with complex financial systems. The former socialist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) possessed certain elements of a financial system, such as savings 
banks and organizations used by the government to store and to channel money; 
however, intermediation and allocation functions were centrally controlled and not left 
to autonomous actors. This arrangement was consistent with the organizational features 
of a centrally planned economy, but it was unsuitable for de-centralized economies that 
relied increasingly on market mechanisms. For such economies to work, a new set of 
arrangements had to be found that allowed for greater dispersion of financial services 
combined with effective checks and balances to guard against the risk of systemic 
failure.  
The story of the transformation of the financial sector in CEE from plan to market has 
been often told (Buch 1996; Rostowski 1995; Tihanyi and Hegarty 2007) and will not 
be recounted here. Nonetheless, recalling how finances were organized under socialist 
regimes serves to illustrate that the operation of financial systems is closely intertwined 
with the organization of the economies and the prevailing governance regime. The 
organization of finance takes one form under one, and quite a different form under 
another. Market economies are commonly distinguished by the organization of their 
financial systems, whether they are predominantly market or bank-based (Allen and 
Gale 2001; Mayer 1998). Both systems have their distinct institutional arrangements 
designed to address the specific vulnerabilities inherent in them. Market-based systems 
are vulnerable to the existence of stock-market bubbles, which may result in a crash. 
Bank-based systems have a high probability of suffering from bank failures and to the 
cyclical nature of credit booms and busts. Most economies have both stock markets and 
banks (Levine 2003), and thus are—albeit to varying degrees—vulnerable to either 
shock.  
The history of financial markets is a history of crises (Kindelberger 2005; Minsky 
1986); but it is equally a history of attempts to mend the institutional arrangements that 
shall prevent them. What is often overlooked is that crisis management itself is a critical 
part of the governance regime for financial markets, arguably the most important one. 
Once one recognizes that financial markets are inherently instable,1 crisis management 
is viewed as an integral part of the governance of finance; it shapes the future behaviour 
of market participants—a fact that is widely acknowledged in concerns about moral 
hazard associated with government bailouts. More importantly, it reveals who is the 
ultimate guardian of the financial system: Whoever has the resources to rescue a 
financial system and as such is capable off-setting the terms for the rescue deal. This 
role is typically denoted as ‘lender of last resort’. In the context of the global crisis the 
role has morphed into ‘investor of last resort’ and even into the all-encompassing 
‘whatever it takes’(Andrews 2009)—a commitment that is more appropriately labelled 
as ‘ultimate guardian’. Using the guardian metaphor also emphasizes that crisis 
                                                 
1   Clearly, this has not been a core assumption of standard finance theory. See, however, Minsky (1986); 
see also Sornette (2004). 2 
management is not about the ‘bail out’ of individual banks or other intermediaries, but 
an attempt to prevent a collapse of the financial system.  
This paper argues that the designation of the ultimate guardian is the result of policy 
choices about the governance of finance. They include decisions about liberalizing 
capital accounts or not; building or not building reserves for ‘rainy days’; pegging, 
floating, or managing the domestic currency; allowing foreign bank 
ownership/dominance, or restricting it; and accepting or rejecting the principle of home 
country regulator for foreign banks operating on one’s territory. These decisions are not 
necessarily made for the purpose of outsourcing the function of the ultimate guardian. In 
fact, most made by countries in CEE were pre-determined by the regional or global 
governance regimes they joined. The combined effect of these policies, however, has 
disabled governments in most CEE countries from protecting their economies against a 
looming crisis as evidenced by their ultimately unsuccessful attempts to control the 
credit boom in the years leading up to the crisis; once the crisis erupted causing the 
drying up of external finance, they were unable to effectively respond to it as their 
resources were no match against the scale of private funds that had earlier flooded their 
economies. 
The countries in CEE may have been motivated to proactively relinquish governance 
over their financial systems in favour or a regional regime. Indeed, the EU has 
undertaken major efforts to Europeanize the governance of finance by standardizing 
financial regulation and improving coordination among national regulators (Corcoran 
and Hart 2002; Ferrarini 2002). It is obviously in the interest of this collective enterprise 
for countries to cede some of their sovereignty over finance. Those countries that have 
joined the European Monetary Union have relinquished their domestic currencies and 
control over monetary policies (Zilioli and Selmayr 2001). Moreover, the policy advice 
given to political leaders in the former socialist world regarding the benefits of financial 
liberalization was motivated by a desire to protect their economies from undue political 
interference and thereby promote prosperity (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2004; World 
Bank 1995, 1996).  
Yet, there is a risk to this strategy—namely, that supranational governance regimes may 
be ineffective and/or serve ulterior interests, and the risk that in the event of a crisis a 
country is forced to depend on an ultimate guardian over whose strategies and policy 
directions it has little control. In the context of the global financial crisis many of these 
risks were realized in countries in CEE. This raises important questions about the costs 
and benefits of the manner in which not only countries in CEE as well as other 
emerging markets integrated into the global financial system. 
2  The role of ultimate guardian in the governance finance 
The operation of finance rests on the credibility of a promise for future returns on 
investment. The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines ‘finance’ as ‘the process of raising 
funds or capital for any kind of expenditure’,2 explaining that some need more money 
today than they have on hand while others have excess money that they can invest and 
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thereby earn interests or dividends. The willingness of those with excess money to 
realize gains from parting with their money depends on the other party’s ability to invest 
productively and to commit to pay returns. The regulatory regime for financial markets 
is primarily concerned with ensuring that the promises made are indeed credible; a 
range of legal and regulatory tools has been employed over time and across countries to 
accomplish this task. They include, among others, legal institutions such as civil and 
criminal courts for enforcing contractual and tort claims; entry regulations for entities 
and persons wishing to offer financial services; prudential requirements for financial 
intermediaries; agencies charged with monitoring and supervising such intermediaries; 
and government sponsored deposit insurances.  
None of these tools, whether in isolation or in combination, have succeeded in 
eliminating financial crises. A possible explanation is that every new legal tool designed 
to contain risk invariably gives rise to strategies aimed at circumventing it. Even a 
perfect legal system could not guard against wide spread default resulting from broadly 
shared misjudgements about the future—not only because the future is difficult to 
predict, but also because collective denial about the sustainability of certain strategies is 
rampant, particularly in financial markets (Avgouleas 2009).  
Perhaps even more importantly, the legal and regulatory tools listed above only partly 
address the supply of money—the very medium of financial transactions (Galbraith 
1976/2001). A substantial change in the money supply can destabilize a financial 
system however well-designed laws and regulations might be. The sources of money 
supply are multiple; they are the government’s printing press, the inflow of foreign 
capital, and the money multiplier effect embedded in the credit system. The relevant 
policy tools for governing the money supply include inflation targeting, the 
management of foreign capital inflows through exchange rate policies, capital controls 
and sterilization efforts, as well as interest rate policies and changes in reserve 
requirements to affect the costs of lending by the private sector. A comprehensive 
analysis of the governance of finance must, therefore, include both the credibility 
problem as well as the supply sides of finance. It is all the more important because the 
two are interdependent. Changes in the supply of money can undermine the credibility 
of financial commitments, and inflation has the potential to undermine parties’ trust in 
the future value of money and increases incentives for borrowers to defect (Wolf 1993). 
As the subprime mortgage crisis suggests, an increase in the supply of credits reduces 
lenders’ vigilance as they seek to expand their market share in an increasingly 
competitive environment. Once the credibility of financial promises is undermined—
whether for reasons associated with credibility or money supply—and financial markets 
freeze up, this delicate system built on promises is prone to collapse.  
Every financial system is vulnerable to credibility as well as to supply shocks. Available 
empirical evidence confirms that financial liberalization—which typically leads to 
greater supply of capital—is positively associated with subsequent financial crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). In the past, the typical response has been to ensure that 
afflicted countries improve their institutions. This was based on the assumption that 
financial markets would operate efficiently as long as they could rely on effective 
institutions. In response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, for example, the 
IMF developed a comprehensive assessment program for the institutions governing 
financial markets around the worlds—the Financial Sector Assessment Programme 4 
(FSAP).3 It uses ‘best practice standards’ drawn from the ‘most advanced’ financial 
systems, such as the US and the UK, to guide other countries in reforming their legal 
and regulatory framework. In the current global financial crisis, the appropriate 
response to the apparent governance failure appears to be less obvious. After all, the 
crisis originated in the very countries that served as best practice models and that were 
home to the very market participants whose efficient operation had been assumed.  
In reality, it is difficult to determine whether a financial crisis is related to bad 
institutions, i.e., the credibility problem of finance, or to excessive supply of capital in 
search for high returns. Recognizing the latter as a problem is made more difficult by 
the fact that capital inflows at first tend to have a positive effect on an economy, 
spurring investment and growth. Thus, policymakers in CEE and advisors at the IMF 
and elsewhere were very much aware of rapid credit expansion in the region in the years 
leading up to the crisis, but could not decide whether this was a good thing (a much 
desired catch-up with the west) or a bad thing (a credit boom that would eventually 
result in a bust). Ideological priors further complicated a correct diagnosis of what was 
happening. Advocates of market self-regulation tend to see the major problem of 
financial crisis not in behaviour of market participants, but in an unwarranted and 
undesirable ‘external’ intervention concocted by politicians: if only politicians were 
able to commit ex ante not to intervene in times of crisis, markets would effectively 
regulate themselves as market participants would fully internalize the costs of their 
actions. This argument assumes that the root cause of financial crises can always be 
found in the credibility problem, i.e., the inability of private agents to credibly commit 
only to those obligations they will be able to fulfil in the future. It largely misses the 
money supply problem. While banks control part of the money supply through the 
money multiplier effect associated with the credit system, each bank can do so only for 
its own lending activities and has no control over the system-wide implications of the 
rapid expansion, to which it contributes only as one among many. A bank that chose to 
cut back its own credit expansion would undercut its ability to compete with others. As 
the former CEO of Citigroup, Prince, famously quibbled, they have little choice but to 
get up and dance—until the music stops. 
Given the indeterminacy of the ultimate causes of a financial crisis and given that the 
financial system is indispensible for the operation of a market economy, it is not 
surprising that most governments will try to protect their financial system from collapse. 
However, individual governments may lack the resources or the credibility to prevent it; 
the actual ultimate guardian, therefore, is not necessarily the domestic government, but 
whoever rescues a financial system. The ultimate guardian may be one or more 
domestic agent (i.e., the central banks and treasury in case of the US rescue operations 
in the global crisis), domestic agents in collaboration with their counterparts in other 
countries (i.e., the Mexican and US governments in the case of the 1994 bailout of the 
Mexican financial system), or multilateral agencies, such as the IMF, typically upon the 
request by domestic governments (i.e., interventions in most countries afflicted by the 
East Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and a series of emerging markets in the ongoing 
global crisis). Thus, the identity of the ultimate guardian is often revealed only in a 
crisis, yet close inspection of a country’s governance arrangements can help determine 
the viability (or lack thereof) of domestic agents and thus establish whether ultimate 
guardianship has been effectively outsourced.  
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When finance in CEE countries dried up as a result of the global financial crisis, their 
governments turned out to be unable to protect their financial systems–and ultimately 
their economies–without outside help. The ‘sudden stop’ of foreign capital inflows (in 
fact the extensive reversal of capital inflows in 2008 and 2009) (Nagy 2009), left their 
economies in freefall and brought their currencies under attack. Luckily for them, help did 
come from various sides; at the time of this writing, the IMF had entered into emergency 
loans with Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine and had concluded 
standby agreements with Poland and Romania. The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) established a joint action program together with the World 
Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB) in January 2009, committing €24.5 billion 
to support the banking sector in the region. The EBRD has already invested €1 billion of 
these funds in Romania and additional funds in Ukraine. In addition, the European Union 
has provided €50 billion for balance of payment support to countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Finally, the European Central Bank (ECB) has entered into and recently 
activated a swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank) to 
help it weather the storm of the financial crisis in the Baltics where many Swedish 
banks are deeply invested (Sweden has not adopted the Euro). The ECB also announced 
co-operations with Narodowy Bank Polski (Poland) as well as Magya Nemzei Bank 
(Hungary) to provide these countries–which had experienced extensive ‘euroization’ 
(Feige and Dean 2002) of their economies–with euro liquidity. These interventions 
benefited countries that received direct assistance, but also other countries as these 
actions signalled that the financial systems of these countries would not be allowed to 
implode. Still, the rescue operations were conducted in an ad hoc fashion and depended 
on the perception of third parties (the IMF, the EBRD, etc.) that assistance was 
warranted, as well as their own willingness and endowment with sufficient resources to 
step in. This uncertainty about the identity of the ultimate guardian and its commitment 
to an afflicted country creates a governance void. 
3  Into the void 
Countries in CEE implemented extensive legal and regulatory reforms to improve their 
financial systems and received guidance and support from the EBRD (EBRD 1998; 
Fries, Neven and Seabright 2002), the World Bank (1996), and most importantly, the 
European Union to this end. One of the first major reform projects of the EBRD in the 
region was to improve the conditions for the development of credit markets by 
reforming the regime for collateralizing credit.4 Additionally, the accession process the 
EU required countries in the region to adapt their laws and regulations to the European 
standards. Lastly, all countries were regular clients of the IMFs’ FSAP.5 Thus, not only 
on paper but also in practice these countries have caught up with the institutional 
standards widely regarded as critical for maintaining financial stability; against this 
background, the rapid expansion of credit in most countries since the late 1990s was 
regarded as a positive response to the institutional reforms that had been implemented 
(Cottarelli et al. 2005). Whereas as of 1998 most countries in CEE still lagged behind 
countries at similar GDP levels in terms of the aggregate size of their credit markets, 
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available at: www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/secured.htm.  
5   For recent FSAP reports on individual countries, see www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp.  6 
they now reached, if not exceeded, these comparative benchmark data.6 The speed with 
which these changes occurred was remarkable. Within a period of only five years (from 
2000 to 2005) the credit to GDP ratio doubled or even tripled in several countries 
(Enoch 2007). Between 2000 and 2004 alone, the average annual credit growth in 
Bulgaria and the three Baltic states was twenty per cent and in Hungary, Romania and 
Croatia the average annual credit growth was over 10 per cent. In Slovenia, the average 
was around 10 per cent. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had credit 
growth been below 5 per cent and at times even negative (Arcalean et al. 2007). The 
credit growth persisted, and in some countries even accelerated in the following years. 
According to Backe, Egert and Walko (2007), ‘at the end of 2006, the annual growth 
rates of credit to the private sector ranged from 17 per cent to 64 per cent in the 
countries covered in this study’, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.7 These data 
almost certainly understate the real growth of credit, as they exclude direct cross-border 
lending by foreign banks to firms and households in these countries (see below). The 
persistent if not accelerating credit growth occurred notwithstanding the fact that many 
countries actively tried to reign in credit growth since the early 2000s. The means used 
varied from country to country, yet they shared a common fate: they proved largely 
ineffective. 
In principle, countries have a broad menu of choices to respond to excessive credit 
expansion. Hilbers, Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2007) have compiled a menu of 
such choices, which includes macroeconomic policy measures to manage supply side of 
money, including fiscal, monetary and exchange rate responses. It also lists prudential, 
supervisory and administrative measures, which address the core credibility issues.8 
While some countries appear to have had temporary success at least in slowing the rate 
of credit growth by employing some of these tools–especially Poland, and to some 
extent Bulgaria—the subsequent renewed expansion of credits suggest that ultimately 
these tools were not effective; this can, at least in part, be explained with the accession 
of countries in CEE to the European Union. In 2004, the three Baltic states, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia joined the EU; in 2007 
Bulgaria and Romania followed suit. All countries experienced a major post-accession 
boom, which has been attributed to increases in capital flows. 
With the accession to the EU, the countries of CEE relinquished important tools for 
governing their financial systems they previously had at their disposal. The restrictions 
                                                 
6   This has been the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. See Figure 2.6 in Arcalean et al. (2007: 
22). 
7   In the United States, a country with a much larger and deeper financial system, credit extended by 
commercial banks grew by about 11 per cent in 2006. See FRB (2006: 22).  
8    In addition, the menu includes two other items, namely ‘market development measures’ and the 
‘promotion of better understanding of risks’. The former includes legal institutions for contract 
enforcement and improved accounting standards, i.e., institutions that fall broadly within the category 
of credibility measures. Other ‘market development measures’ like hedging instruments as well as 
‘market based’ risk diversification instruments potentially have implications for the credibility as well 
as the money supply sides of financial governance. See the country reports in Enoch and Ötker-Robe 
(2005). 7 
on policy choices imposed by EU law are plenty.9 With respect to the governance of 
money supply, most restrictions can be traced to the new member states’ commitment to 
strive towards introducing the Euro. Specifically, Articles 3 and 4 of the respective 
Accession Treaty entered into by each new member state provides that it participates in 
the monetary union from the date of accession. Yet, the adoption of the Euro has been 
delayed, as membership has been derogated in accordance with Article 122 of the 
Maastricht Treaty until the relevant convergence criteria have been met. These include 
fiscal restraint and the reduction of government debt, price and interest rate stability, 
and exchange rate stability. The European Central Bank monitors convergence and 
issues annual convergence reports.10  
Some policies associated with the convergence criteria work towards taming a credit 
boom. Fiscal restraint is the most obvious one. The implications of interest rate, price 
and exchange rate stability requirements are more ambivalent. Hilbers, Ötker-Robe and 
Pazarbasioglu  (2007) list greater exchange rate flexibility as an important tool for 
controlling rapid credit expansion. Indeed, Poland seems to have been quite successful 
in employing such strategies at times, but the ECB took note of this in its convergence 
report (ECB 2008).11 Other countries had their hands bound by pegging their exchange 
rates or using currency board arrangements that required a tight exchange rate 
management. Among the various macroeconomic tools for taming the credit boom, this 
left them only with fiscal policies (Hilbers, Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu 2007: 101).  
In addition, the EU is in the process of harmonizing the financial governance regime 
across member states as part of the integration of European financial markets. Notably, 
the free movement of capital was the last of the ‘four freedoms’ tackled by the EU. 
After creating the conditions for the free flow of goods, persons, and (most) services, 
serious attempts to harmonize financial market regulation were made only with the 
adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999; the regime that evolved in the 
subsequent years became part of the Acquis Communautaire, which the new member 
states had to comply with prior to being accepted as new member states. No serious 
attempts were made to modify the impact of this regime on the new member states 
despite the fact that their financial systems were still in the early stages of 
transformation and nowhere nearly as developed as the mature financial systems of old 
member states at the time they conceded that it was time to liberalize. 
The EU governance regime for credit institutions has strong parallels in the global 
financial governance regime developed by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). 
However, the Basel Concordat as well as the two Basel Accords (I & II) is ‘soft law’ 
and as such not legally binding. In contrast, a EU directive requires member states to 
transpose the directive into national law. The key governance principles for finance in 
the EU are home country regulation, bilateral coordination among home and host 
country regulators under the leadership of the home country regulator, and multilateral 
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identifies legal constraints under EU law. 
10  The ECB convergence reports are available at www.ecb.int/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html. 
11 The ECB (2008) noted that ‘in March 2008 the real effective exchange rate for the Polish zloty stood 
well above and the real bilateral exchange rate against the euro was somewhat above the 
corresponding ten-year historical averages.’ However it did caution not to over-interpret the results in 
light of Poland’s convergence process.  8 
coordination within a three level system within the EU.12 Attempts to vest the ECB 
with centralized regulatory powers over finance or to create an alternative EU wide 
regulator have met with stiff resistance by member states, as well as from their 
respective financial industries. Therefore, a coordinative governance regime—the so-
called ‘Lamfalussy Process’—which had originally been developed for the governance 
of securities markets (Lamfalussy 2001), was extended to credit institutions (Vander 
Stichele 2008).  
The basic idea of this process named, after the chair of the ‘Committee of Wise Men’ 
that authored the report, is that EU directives (level 1) set forth the general framework 
for financial market governance. The implementation and enforcement of the directives 
by domestic legislatures and regulators shall be guided by complementary guidelines 
developed by two committees. At level 2, the European Banking Committee, and any 
body run by the European Commission, shall facilitate the implementation of directives 
by addressing political issues as well as design problems. At level 3, the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) brings together regulators from the member 
states involved in the regulation of banks. CEBS is charged with providing technical 
advice and ensuring the consistent implementation of the directive by dispersed national 
regulators. In addition to collecting information, conducing peer review and involving 
the financial industry through consultation processes, CEBS also functions as mediator 
in disputes between home and host country regulator. 
The complexity of the process and the sheer size of the new committees (51 regulators 
from 27 countries are currently represented in CEBS) as well as the lack of actual 
enforcement powers leave key decisionmaking in the hands of domestic regulators: the 
regulator in the jurisdiction where a credit institution has been authorized (licensed). A 
bank wishing to establish a branch in another EU member state can do so by simply 
notifying the regulatory authorities of that country. The same applies if the same bank 
wishes to offer financial services in another member state without channelling them 
either through a branch or a subsidiary, thus facilitating direct cross-border lending. 
This European passport system was designed to promote financial market integration by 
reducing regulatory costs for transnational financial intermediaries within the common 
market. In contrast, for a separately incorporated entity, i.e., a subsidiary–special 
authorization is still required.  
The distinction between branches and subsidiaries can be interpreted to suggest that 
domestic regulators maintain full regulatory authority over credit institutions 
incorporated and licensed within their territory, irrespective of their ownership structure. 
In other words, the fact that 65 to 98 per cent of bank assets in CEE countries are 
foreign-owned should not matter much, as by far the majority of these banks are fully 
(domestically) incorporated subsidiaries rather than branch offices. This contrasts with 
the rest of the EU, where foreign branches rather than foreign-owned subsidiaries have 
been much more common. However, in practice the distinction between branches and 
subsidiaries has become blurred. Two factors account for this: First, banks with EU 
                                                 
12  Most of these principles are reflected in Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
(recast), 30 June 2006, OJ L 177/1 and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast), 
30 June 2006, OJ L 177/201. 9 
wide or global operations treat subsidiaries increasingly as branch offices; they have 
morphed into vertically integrated financial groups with centralized strategies 
implemented throughout the group in a manner that is oblivious of national borders and 
formal differences between branch offices and subsidiaries. The latter remain relevant 
mostly for accounting and tax purposes. The corollary to the changing industry practice 
has been the consolidation of regulation for financial groups operating in more than one 
country.13 Relevant EU directives allocate regulatory oversight over subsidiaries of EU 
parent credit institutions and financial holdings to the home regulator of the parent. This 
‘consolidated supervision’ entails the ‘coordination of the gathering and dissemination 
of relevant or essential information’ as well as the ‘planning and coordination of 
supervisory activities’ for the going concern as well as in emergency situations.14 Home 
country regulators of the subsidiaries shall consult and coordinate with host country 
regulators. This division of labour has been re-enforced by the so-called home-host 
guidelines adopted by CEBS (one of the banking committees established as part of the 
Lamfalussy framework). Upon consultation with the finance industry, these guidelines 
emphasize that in order to reduce regulatory costs, the home country regulators of the 
subsidiary should seek information not from the subsidiary or its parent, but from the 
parent’s home country regulator. The finance industry has made no secret that it would 
favour comprehensive delegation of supervisory powers to the parent’s home country 
regulator.15 Technically, this has been feasible since the adoption of the credit 
institutions directive in 2000, but so far not a single domestic regulator has done so. In 
light of the dominance of foreign bank ownership of the domestic banking sector in 
CEE—which implies that virtually all banks in these countries are subject to 
consolidated supervision by the home country regulator of the parent—the difference 
between consolidated and delegated supervision is, however, less pronounced than 
suggested by the law on the books.  
The dominance of foreign banks in CEE countries is a result of privatization in the 
1990s and the opening of the financial service sector to foreign investors in anticipation 
of EU membership. The asset share of foreign-owned banks in CEE countries ranges 
from a low of 36 per cent in Slovenia to a high of 98 per cent in Estonia (ECB 2005). 
Only in Estonia and Latvia (47 per cent) is the asset share below 50 per cent. In 
comparison, in Latin America the asset share of foreign-owned banks is, on average, 45 
per cent. Only New Zealand and Botswana have financial systems that are dominated by 
foreign owners to an extent that matches the countries of CEE. This suggests that the 
financial systems of CEE countries have been integrated into multinational financial 
groups with headquarters located outside their jurisdiction (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
2008). The home country regulators of the parent banks viewed these developments 
favourably, as they positively affected the growth of ‘their’ institutions, and regulators 
in CEE countries still had at least nominal regulatory control over subsidiaries and 
could seek information about them via the parent’s home country regulator. Indeed, 
regulators in most CEE countries have signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
with regulators in the home countries of parent banks that own or control banks within 
their jurisdiction, however, they could do little to enforce their ultimate policy objective, 
                                                 
13  See Arts. 129 of Directive 2006/48 op cit at 14. 
14  See Art. 129 Credit Institution Directives 48/2006 EC. 
15   See comments by the Federation of European Banks (FEBS) on the home-host-country guidelines 
issued by CEBS. See www.cebs.eu.  10 
namely to guard the stability of their domestic markets when the group switched 
strategies in response to regulatory constraints they tried to impose. In particular, they 
could not prevent parent companies form lending directly to side-step constraints 
imposed on their subsidiaries by CEE regulators. In a recent study, researchers at the 
Austrian Central Bank revealed that direct lending by the Austrian parent company 
grew rapidly between 2002 and 2007 amounting to over €36 billion annually in 2007. In 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 direct lending by Austrian parent banks grew by an 
annual rate of 20 per cent on average and in Bulgaria and Romania (both of whom 
joined in 2007) by 50 per cent. As it turns out, most of the borrowers in CEE countries 
were leasing companies affiliated with the same banking group that owned one or more 
bank subsidiaries in the same country; the critical difference is that, as leasing 
companies rather than banks, they escaped the regulations CEE countries sought to 
impose on their domestic banks to counter the effects of an accelerating credit boom.16 
In other words, the group had found an easy mechanism to arbitrage around regulatory 
constraints. For countries in the region, direct lending came at the additional risk of 
foreign currency exposure: 85.4 per cent of these direct loans were denominated in 
foreign currency (ONB 2009). While Euro-denominated loans dominated direct lending, 
the Swiss franc became increasingly common in Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia. 
The combination of financial liberalization within the EU, the dominance of financial 
groups from other EU member states, and the emphasis on reducing regulatory costs for 
these groups by consolidating regulatory oversight in the hands of the home country 
regulator implies that CEE countries have effectively abdicated the governance of their 
domestic financial markets. Undoubtedly, the integration of CEE banks into 
multinational banking groups has also benefitted these countries. Reforming the 
financial sector in the post-socialist CEE countries has previously proven itself difficult, 
and the influx of foreign capital and expertise was widely regarded as critical for their 
speedy transformation. Moreover, foreign bank ownership shielded banks against 
downturns in their domestic economy. Empirical analysis of the lending practice of 
multinational financial groups suggests that they tend to cross-subsidize subsidiaries in 
countries facing a temporary downturn (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2008), helping 
many banks in the region weather the first impact of the global crisis, yet, the study also 
suggests that the same intra-group dynamics that operate in a counter-cyclical fashion 
when the locus of downturn is the economy in which the subsidiary is located turns pro-
cyclical when the downturn affects the parent’s home economy. Thus, the price for 
insurance against purely local economic troubles is exposure to problems that originate 
with the parent company or its home market. The global crisis has revealed that this 
price can be substantial; in 2008 alone US$57 billion left the region as banking groups 
withdrew their capital to protect their home base (Nagy: supra note 5). 
4  Wither financial governance in CEE? 
The policy choices made by countries in the CEE region have effectively outsourced 
governance of their financial systems, and most critically, the role of ultimate guardian. 
                                                 
16 See ONB (2009): ‘… the share of recipient intra-group FIs increased from 65 per cent to more than 
70 per cent of total direct credit to FIs. These growth rates are inter alia due to the growing importance 
of leasing firms affiliated with Austrian firms’. 11 
This conclusion begs the question: to whom? There is no simple answer to this question, 
which is why in crises these countries find themselves devoid of reliable governance. In 
the end, the most vulnerable countries had to rely on the IMF while others benefited 
from the announcement of the EBRD and the ECB to stand ready for additional aid if 
need be (see above).  
With respect to crisis prevention in the form of credibility enhancement or management 
of parts of the money supply, regulatory oversight was transferred to the home countries 
of the dominant banking groups. As a result, the most important regulators of banks 
located in CEE countries are those of Austria, Italy,17 Sweden, and Belgium as banks 
from these countries dominate the scene in CEE countries. The new scope of regulatory 
jurisdiction of Austria and Sweden recalls their spheres of influence in past eras of 
empire building; yet, the commitment to guard the interests of these countries and 
protect them against financial crises has been limited. This raises the question whether 
the concept of coordinated governance over financial markets is workable: clearly, the 
European financial governance framework is still a work in progress, nonetheless, it is 
worth asking how this framework will affect different countries in good as well as in 
bad times. Ultimately this requires an investigation into the interests and purposes the 
governance regime shall serve. The relevant EU directives skirt the issue by assuming 
that if all credit institutions complied with the standards established therein, and all 
domestic regulators made sure that they did, financial markets should operate and 
savings should be protected.18 In such a conceptualization, there is little room for 
conflicting objectives of prudential regulation and oversight from the perspective of the 
home and host country regulators whether in times of relative stability or in times of 
crisis. Yet, such conflicts are easily conceivable. As Herring (2007) suggests, from the 
host country perspective, the ‘nightmare scenarios’ involve a foreign entity with a large 
share of local (i.e., host country) markets ‘to be systematically important, while at the 
same time, being so small relative to the parent group that it is not regarded as 
significant to the condition of the parent company’; in this case, the home country 
regulator may not see a case for intervention as it is naturally concerned with the 
stability of the financial group for its own market, not with the stability of the financial 
system of countries in which that group operates a subsidiary. For CEE countries the 
basic features of this ‘nightmare scenario’ are endemic: not only are their domestic 
banking systems dominated by foreign financial groups, but the banking system is 
highly concentrated. As of 2005, the top five banks in key CEE countries had a market 
concentration ratio19 ranging from 48 per cent in Poland to 99 per cent in Estonia (Uhde 
and Heimeshoff 2009). As noted above, foreign-owned banks’ asset share in the same 
countries is between 36 per cent (Slovenia) to 97 per cent (Estonia) (Enoch 2007). Put 
differently, a few foreign banking groups own most of the banking sectors in any given 
CEE countries. Even for Poland, the largest country among the new member states, the 
importance of foreign owned banks to the domestic economy is far greater than the 
importance of its subsidiaries to the portfolio of the foreign bank that serves as its parent 
                                                 
17  As a result of Unicredit acquiring the Austrian Bank Creditanstalt. 
18  Recital 5 of Directive 2006/48/EC lists as one of the objectives ‘to protect savings and to create equal 
conditions of competition between these institutions.’ 
19 Calculated as the fraction of assets of the total banking system’s assets held by the five largest 
domestic and foreign banks per country. See Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009: 1299-311). The ECB 
(2005) confirms a high concentration ratio in these countries.  12 
company (Bednarski and Starnowski 2007). In a small country like Croatia, Austrian 
banks controlled 60 per cent of the banking sector as of 2007 (Gardor 2008), which 
translates into 14.7 per cent of total Austrian banking assets;20 this is not trivial, and 
indeed Croatia features prominently in the annual report of the Austrian Financial 
Market Authority (FMA) after the Czech Republic and Romania as one of the three 
‘main countries’ among all countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in 
which Austrian banks hold assets. Notably, the ranking employed by the Austrian FMA 
is by asset value, and not by the systemic effect that Austrian banks’ activities might 
have on the host country’s financial system. It clearly reflects the perspective that the 
home country regulator brings to its role as consolidated regulator. Indeed, the 
presentation of Austrian bank exposure in CEE both in the annual report of the FMA 
and the Financial Stability Report of Austria’s Central Bank (Österreichische 
Nationalbank, ONB) is illuminating. For the FMA, CEE features primarily as a place of 
expansion and a profit centre:  
The region of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) 
became even more important to Austria’s banks in 2008. The aggregate 
balance sheet total, following some restructuring, grew by close to 30 per 
cent during the third quarter of 2008 compared with the same period of 
2007 to approximately €272 billion, whilst the result for the period rose 
by a disproportionately high amount, up by around 47 per cent to close to 
€3.45 billion (FMA 2008).  
The ONB reported that the ‘exposure’ of Austrian banks in the region has had negative 
repercussions for the Austrian banking sector during the crisis, but downplayed the 
likely effect on the Austrian financial system as ‘the Austrian financial intermediaries 
are regionally diversified, a factor that reduces the risk of country specific or sub-
regional clustering’ (ONB 2009: 46).21 Whether the countries on the receiving end of 
Austrian banks’ expansion strategies are similarly diversified is apparently of little 
concern. 
In sum, the focus of home country regulators is on their domestic banks and their 
domestic financial system, yet, in the event of a crisis—whatever its cause—someone 
must assume the role of ultimate guardian for the sake of people living in the countries 
on the receiving end of capital flows, both for their own sake and to avoid spillover 
effects for the European or the global system.22 In the capital exporting countries of 
Europe and elsewhere, home country governments have stepped in aggressively for the 
benefit of their own national systems. They have left multilaterals to deal with those 
                                                 
20  According to FMA (2008), total assets of Austria’s financial markets amount to € 1069.3 billion, 44.7 
per cent of which is held by banks (Table 3). Thus, total assets of the Austrian banking sector in 2008 
amounted to €478 billion (FMA 2008: Table 6 Table 6 and accompanying text). €32.26 billion in 
Croatian bank assets held by Austrian banks.  
21  Translation by author.  
22  This threat has been clearly voiced by the Erik Berglöf, the EBRD’s chief economist, who wrote on 
the EBRD blog in May 2009 that not only do foreign banks affect CEE countries, but CEE countries 
can invoke policies that might adversely affect the banks located in other EU member states: 
‘…Eastern European governments can also damage the international bank groups by preventing them 
from transferring profits or adjusting their exposures. The public pressures to interfere are great’. 
Available at www.ebrdblog.com (7 May 2009). 13 
countries that served as capital importers during good times. Thus, the ONB reassured 
readers in its financial stability report in June 2009 that ‘in light of recent rescue 
measure by the IMF and the EU Commission, extreme scenarios have become much 
less likely’ (ONB 2009).  
This is good news for everyone, including the people of the CEE countries, however, it 
also goes to show that countries that have been subjected to unconstrained cross-border 
capital flows—and as a result, have lost the ability to rescue themselves—must depend 
on the IMF and other multilateral organizations to perform the role of ultimate guardian 
once the risks inherent in such a strategy materialize. The implication of the IMF’s 
governance structure with its peculiar voting system is that most countries on the 
recipient side of IMF rescue packages have little influence on the design of these 
policies. The ten CEE countries that recently joined the EU, for example, jointly hold 
2.75 per cent of voting rights.23 At the EBRD they control 5 per cent.24 The countries 
that had experienced the East Asian financial crisis learned that lesson ten years ago. 
They did not like the policies imposed by IMF conditionalities, which let them to 
experiment with their own insurance devices. Some closed their borders to free capital 
flows, as Malaysia did, however temporarily (Jomo 2006). CEE countries are prevented 
from exercising this option by EU treaty obligations, which prohibit restrictions on 
cross-border capital flows within the EU not only vis-à-vis other member states abut 
also vis-à-vis third countries.25 Alternatively, countries can make provisions for ‘rainy 
days’ by ensuring that they will have sufficient resources to conduct their own rescue 
should the occasion arise again. Indeed China,26 Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Singapore have doubled their stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves in the years 
following the East Asian financial crisis, with over US$800 billion collectively 
controlling 38 per cent of global reserves by the end of 2002 (Aizenman and Marion 
2003). This option, however, presupposes a strong export base for earning foreign 
currency. It would also run counter to the aspirations and obligations of the new 
members states to join the euro.  
The EU has meanwhile developed a number of proposals to reform the governance of 
finance following the recommendations of the De Larosière report (2008). The central 
theme of these reforms is to strengthen European supervisory and monitoring bodies, 
including CEBS, which is to be renamed into European Banking Authority (EBA) and 
to ensure that host countries are better represented in the regulation of multinational 
groups by including them in the colleges of supervisors, which, however, will be led by 
the home country regulator. The proposals fall short of full centralization, yet do little to 
strengthen the position of host countries to protect themselves against future excessive 
capital flows. Within the current EU legal framework, that would be difficult in light of 
                                                 
23  Own calculation based on information on voting rights available at www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm 
24  Whereas at the IMF voting rights are determined by the size of the economy at the date of entry (with 
some adjustments made over time), the Basic Document of the EBRD provides that voting rights are 
determined by the number of subscribed shares in the capital stock of the bank (Art. 29). Calculations 
are based on subscription levels published on the EBRD website.  
25  See Art. 56 (1) EU Treaty. 
26 China did not suffer from the East Asian financial crisis as it still had capital controls in place. 
However, it responded to the lessons learnt from observing its neighbours. 14 
the strong commitment of free movement of capital and the substantial degree of 
harmonization, which effectively limits the member states’ policy space (Pistor 2010). 
This raises the question, whether countries in CEE have other options. Two come to 
mind. One is to push for a central regulator for the entire European Union that replaces 
national regulators for all financial groups with cross-border operations. This option has 
been repeatedly proposed within the EU, but has been vetoed by powerful countries, 
most notably the UK. Alternatively, individual countries could assert greater regulatory 
power by asserting effect-based regulatory power over their financial system—
irrespective of where an entity with a material effect on that system is domiciled or 
whether relevant actions are taken. Effect-based regulation is commonly applied in 
antitrust law, including the EU, both within the EU and with respect to its external 
relations. Because anti-competitive behaviour is widely perceived to restrain the free 
flow of goods, decentralized enforcement by individual countries that assert extra-
territorial reach of domestic law is widely perceived to be compatible with the EU 
Treaty as well as international trade obligations. In contrast, similar constraints on the 
free flow of capital would constitute a violation of the EU Treaty. It may be justified on 
a case-by-case basis on public policy grounds, but within the existing framework has to 
be treated as exception rather than the rule.  
5  Concluding comments: implications for the global governance of finance 
The financial crises that swept emerging financial markets in the 1990s and the early 
2000s left the impression that the world could, and should, be divided into two camps: 
countries with good institutions capable of participating in an increasingly globalized 
financial system on one hand, and countries with bad institutions that participated at 
their own peril, if at all, on the other. The global crisis that has engulfed members of 
both camps and the aftermath of the crisis suggest a different divide: countries that are 
capable of bailing themselves out, and those that are not. This difference implies that the 
two groups of countries have different demands on the governance regime for global 
finance. For countries with bailout capacity and sufficient political clout to act 
independently irrespective of existing regional or international commitments, a global 
regime serves two critical purposes: it enables the financial intermediaries it houses to 
expand in good times, and facilitates cross-border workouts for them in bad times. In 
comparison, countries that have either de jure or de facto abdicated their role as ultimate 
guardian for their financial system have greater needs for risk management in good 
times to reduce the probability of a crisis. They also are more dependent on external 
help to bail out their financial system in the event of a crisis.  
The governance regime for global financial markets as it existed prior to the crisis 
played a critical role as enabler for global expansion strategies of financial groups, most 
of which are located in countries with ultimate guardianship capabilities. It has been less 
effective in providing cross-border workouts—something that not surprisingly has 
become a major focus of future reforms. The IMF has repeatedly performed the role of 
ultimate guardian to countries that lacked this capacity. In that sense, there already 
exists a workout regime for afflicted financial systems. Whether it served the interest of 
those countries is much disputed by the countries around the world that have been 
subjected to IMF policies. But it is probably beyond dispute that the IMF has used its 
influence in countries it has helped rescue at least in part to re-enforce the first strategy, 15 
namely to foster the global expansion of financial groups by streamlining institutional 
and regulatory conditions around the world; moreover, the regime fell short of adequate 
risk management with respect to countries that were unable to protect themselves 
against financial crises. Instead, financial liberalization was endorsed without much 
concern for the lack of an appropriate global governance regime that could cope with 
major financial crises.  
Reform proposals currently under discussion do not depart from this trend. Most 
address regulatory standards, that is, the credibility problem of financial governance, as 
well as post-crisis workouts for financial intermediaries. In addition, the G20 has 
committed to strengthen the IMF, and G20 countries have collectively agreed to commit 
US$850 billion to ensure that capital will keep flowing to emerging markets and 
developing countries—that is, to ensure that the IMF has the capacity to bail them out if 
needed. Moreover, the IMF is signalling a renewed willingness to improve its own 
governance structure to reclaim the legitimacy it has lost. However, neither the G20 nor 
the IMF have put much efforts into designing a regime that would address the 
vulnerability of countries and financial systems that have lost control over the supply 
side of money. That would require questioning a key assumption on which the current 
regime rests, namely that unconstrained capital flows are an unmitigated good.  
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